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What is the most important issue in effective securities regulation that
was not addressed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002? In my opinion, it is
the issue of self-funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC" or "Commission"). The experience of the SEC in the years immedi-
ately preceding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was one of an agency substantially
underfinanced by Congress with a staff inadequate to fully perform such core
functions as review of required filings.
This dysfunction was the result of the inability of the Commission to ef-
fectively secure appropriations to match its staff needs for the regulatory
problems it was established to address. From the perspective of the White
House and Congress, the SEC was just another agency. Its staff and budget
requirements were consolidated with those of other agencies, and its rate of
budgetary and staff adjustments were similar in significant aspects to the
Executive Branch as a whole. Congress did not have the ability to focus on
the precise regulatory dynamics of an agency like the SEC, to distinguish its
needs from those of other agencies, and to address them in a timely fashion.
The Commission is subject to a somewhat unique further type of budg-
etary dynamic. Its need for a larger staff tends to increase during market
surges. It is exactly when stock prices are climbing that support for effective
securities regulation is likely to decrease. It is also exactly during market
surges that an adequately staffed SEC could most effectively deter securities
fraud which tends to burgeon after periods of an inadequately funded SEC.
* Dean and Ethan A.H. Shepley University Professor, Washington University School
of Law. Let me express my gratitude to Professors Ronald Levin and Troy Paredes for their
thoughtful comments about earlier drafts of this essay. I am grateful to Nova Southeastern
University Shepard Broad Law Center and the Leo Goodwin Sr. Chair in Law Program for the
opportunity to have developed these ideas and presented them at Nova Southeastern Univer-
sity Shepard Broad Law Center, to the Securities Law & Policy Seminar led by Professor
Elena Marty-Nelson, to the faculty at Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center, and to the subsequent faculty presentation at the University of Iowa College of Law.
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This essay attempts to illustrate through recent historical experience the
need for a new approach to SEC funding. It should be read with two caveats.
First, the case for agency self-funding can be persuasively articulated
only if one accepts the need for independent regulatory agencies. Agency
independence is a debatable proposition, but I do believe that the preference
for an independent SEC is also validated by historical experience.
Second, I do not believe that SEC self-funding will be an easy proposal
for Congress to adopt. Congress generally prefers control of budgetary purse
strings as a technique to control how the independent regulatory agencies
function. It is a crude technique. If there is one clear lesson from the SEC's
recent history it is that a new approach to the Commission's budget should
be a priority because the costs of delayed adequate SEC staff are so damag-
ing to our economy.
I. THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES GENERALLY
The genius of the United States Constitution was to popularize a tripar-
tite separation of legislative, executive, and judicial power as a means to
limit the power of the executive. As a technique for dispersing potential
autocracy, our Constitution has generally succeeded.
As a technique for governance of complex social phenomena, by the
late nineteenth century, the Constitution's tripartite model was inadequate.
In 1932, just before the New Deal, Felix Frankfurter, then a Professor at
Harvard Law School, wrote in the preface to one of the earliest administra-
tive law casebooks, about "the distinctive development of our era:"
Governmental regulation of banking, insurance, public utilities, industry,
finance, immigration, the professions, health and morals, in short, the in-
evitable response of government to the needs of modern society, is build-
ing up a body of enactments not written by legislatures and of adjudica-
tions not made by courts, and only to a limited degree subject to their revi-
sions. These powers are lodged in vast congeries of agencies. We are in
the midst of a process, still largely unconscious and unscientific, of adjust-
ing the play of these powers to the traditional system of Anglo-American
law and courts.
In retrospect, it is obvious that the emergence of "vast congeries of
agencies" is among the most fundamental transformations to have occurred
in twentieth century American governance. Today, it is commonplace to
assume that most routine Executive Branch decisions will be made by the
1. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 59 (1982).
[Vol. 28:2:233
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administrative agencies. Administrative agencies can be divided between
those that are housed within Cabinet departments such as the Internal Reve-
nue Service, which is part of the Treasury Department, and those that are
more formally independent of the White House such as the Federal Reserve
System, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Federal Trade Commission,
and the SEC.
James Landis, one of the drafters of the initial federal securities laws,
was responsible for the most memorable amplification of Frankfurter's view
of government-by-independent administrative agency.2 In 1938, responding
to criticism that the independent administrative agencies had become "a
headless fourth branch of the government, a haphazard deposit of irresponsi-
ble agencies and uncoordinated powers."3 Landis defended the administra-
tive process as "the most significant development in legal history in the last
century," essentially because of "the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form
of government to deal with modern problems."5 In Landis's view, only the
administrative agencies could "provide for the efficient functioning of the
economic processes of the state."6  Legislation was "forced to represent
compromise,"7 and often "does so by the use of vague phraseology. 8 The
Judiciary had a broad general jurisdiction, depriving it of the ability "to
maintain a long-time uninterrupted interest in a relatively narrow and care-
fully defined area of economic and social activity." 9 Neither branch could
regulate industry as effectively as the administrators of an agency with a
specific function.'°
"As Landis put it: 'With the rise of regulation, the need for expertness
became dominant; for the art of regulating an industry requires knowledge of
the details of its operations, ability to shift requirements as the condition of
the industry may dictate.""'
Disparaging legislation that attempted to prescribe in too great detail "the
conditions of administrative action," and administrators who took "the
legislative approach" of reading "a governing statute with the hope of
finding limitations upon authority," Landis argued that the appropriate re-
2. Id. at 61-62.
3. Id. at 62.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 62.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 62 (quoting JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS 23-24 (1938)).
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lationship of the democratic legislature to the expert agency was to define
the agency's area of expertise and recite the appropriate problems for it to
solve, leaving it broad discretion as to means. Exceeding even Frank-
furter's faith in administrative experts, Landis would recommend in his
seminal work, The Administrative Process, greater insulation of the
agency from court review and an increase in the sanctions agencies could
enforce. He would urge that the "singleness" of an agency's function
would lead to "a professionalism of spirit" that would justify its greater
independence. 2
Let us test the Frankfurter-Landis theory with a case study of the SEC.
II. A CASE STUDY: THE SEC
During the period after the New Deal, this nation's system of corporate
finance was significantly improved. Long gone are the days when new secu-
rities sales were dominated by private investment banks, such as J. P. Mor-
gan and Company, when references to "bear raids" or stock market "pools"
appeared daily in the nation's press, when the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE") fairly could be described as a "private club," and when Senate
hearings riveted the nation's attention with revelations of fraudulent Peruvian
bond sales, "preferred" stockholder lists, bribed journalists who "touted"
securities, or stock price manipulation. Gone too are the public utility hold-
ing companies, the least justifiable corporate structure to evolve during the
1920s' "bull" market, "blank" corporate proxies, and the time when securi-
ties fraud usually was irremediable because of the deficiencies of state corpo-
rate law. In 1975, fixed minimum commission rates, a way of life on the
NYSE since 1792, were abolished.
The principal actor in this transformation of corporate finance was the
SEC. During and immediately after the New Deal period, the SEC earned
the reputation as one of the most ably administered federal independent regu-
latory agencies, principally because of the competence of the Commission's
staff, the agency's role in restoring confidence in the safety of securities in-
vestment in the 1935-1937 period, the SEC's 1937-1938 reorganization of
the NYSE's governance, and the Commission's enforcement of the geo-
graphic integration and corporate simplification provisions of the Public Util-
ity Holding Company Act.
The SEC's performance after World War 1I, by contrast, has been fre-
quently criticized. Although the quality of the Commission's staff and its
enforcement and mandatory disclosure programs have generally received
high marks, the SEC's caution in challenging the NYSE's fixed commission
12. Id.
[Vol. 28:2:233
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rates and anticompetitive rules early in the 1970s was severely criticized by
Congress, the Justice Department, and independent commentators. More
recently, the SEC was criticized for the slow pace with which it facilitated
the creation of a competitive national market system and its oversight of ac-
counting standard setting and corporate governance.
The latter critique of the Commission intensified during the past decade.
Consider what is generally regarded as the successful chairmanship of Arthur
Levitt between 1993 and 2001, to highlight recent stresses on the agency.
In the last years of the 20th Century, the United States securities mar-
kets experienced an almost unimaginable growth and vitality. When the
stock market began its collapse in September 1929, the aggregate value of all
shares on the NYSE was approximately $90 billion. 3 By 2000, NYSE capi-
talization had grown to nearly $12.4 trillion.' 4 Remarkably in 2000, over
$2.3 trillion in new securities were sold in some 16,481 corporate underwrit-
ings and 3,540 private placements.15
Underlying this almost unimaginable growth was the longest sustained
bull market in United States history. Focusing on year end closing indexes,
the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose from 875 in 1981 to 11,497 in 1999,
paralleling similar surges in other leading composite indexes.' 6 To put this in
different terms, between 1981 and 1999, the NYSE stock market capitaliza-
tion increased nearly eleven fold from $1.1 to $12.3 trillion. 7
During the boom years of this great bull market, Arthur Levitt served as
SEC Chair.' 8 It was a period of near boundless ebullience. Early in his
chairmanship, Levitt began a speech: "Just before the S.E.C.'s creation in
1934, the Dow Jones Industrial Average hit an all-time low of forty-one
points. In 1994, it hit an all-time high of 3,978.36."' 9 By 1997, he would
observe, "[i]n the past year, the Dow Jones Industrial Average has broken
5,000, 6,000 and 7,000 point[] [levels]., '20 As in the 1920's, references were
made to "The New Economy" as well as to the Dot.com boom.2'
13. Id. at 1.
14. SEC. INDus. ASS'N, SEC. IND. FACT BOOK 48(2001).
15. Id. at 12.
16. Jd. at 54.
17. Id. at 48.
18. See Jake Ulick, Year of the Scandal 2002: Greed, Accounting Conflicts, Book-
cooking Helped Derail Wall Street. Will 2003 be Any Better?, CNN MONEY, Dec. 17, 2002,
at http://money.cnn.com/2002/12/17/news/reviewscandals/.
19. Arthur Levitt, Remarks at the Public Securities Association Annual Meeting (Mar. 4,
1994).
20. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1998: Hearings on H.R .2267 and S. 1022 Before a Senate
2004]
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A core issue during the Levitt Chairmanship was resources. During the
first Bush administration, Fiscal Years ("FY") 1989-1993, the Commission
budget grew from $142.6 million to $253.2 million, an average of 19% per
year;22 its staff from 2,604 positions to 3,083 or an average of 4.6% per
23 2year. This was a significant achievement for the Breeden SEC.24
Growth during the Levitt chairmanship was considerably slower. Be-
tween FY 1993 and FY 2000, the SEC budget grew from $253.2 million to
$382.4 million or an average of 6% per year.25 Staff positions grew from
3,083 to 3,235 or an average of less than 1% per year.26 During the 1990s'
bull market, virtually every significant measure of securities activity grew far
faster. Between 1993 and 2000, for example, the dollar value of securities
filed for registration grew from $868 billion to $2.3 trillion,27 an average
increase of 24% per year; the number of underwritten securities more than
doubled in the shorter period of 1993 to 1999 (increasing from 6,443 to
13,923).28 Similarly, the dollar value of investment companies grew from
$2.4 trillion in 1993 to $6.7 trillion in 2002,29 an average annual increase of
21.3% per year; the number of investment company portfolios grew from
21,200 to 3 1,100 during the same period, an average annual increase of 5.1%
per year. 30 "In calendar year 1992, the [SEC] supervised over 8,200 broker-
dealers with 34,000 branch offices and 427,000 registered representa-
tives . ...,,3 By 2001, the number of registered broker-dealers had declined
to 7,900, but the number of branch offices had increased to 87,765 (an aver-
age annual increase of 17.6%) and the number of registered representatives
had grown to 683,240 (an average annual increase of 6.7%).32 The value of
stock listed on all exchanges approximately tripled between 1992 and 2000
(increasing from $3.97 trillion to $11.73 trillion).33
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 212 (1997) (statement of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Appropriations for 1998].
21. Id.
22. Fran Hawthorne, Memo to Arthur Levitt, Rose Petals Today, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Aug. 1993, at 55, 56.
23. 1993 SEC ANN. REP. 150.
24. Hawthorne, supra note 22, at 55.
25. 1993 SEC ANN. REP. 80; 2000 SEC ANN. REP. 159.
26. 1993 SEC ANN. REP. 150; 2000 SEC ANN. REP. 159.
27. Compare 1993 SEC ANN. REP. 51, with 2000 SEC ANN. REP. 70.
28. SEC. INDUS. ASS'N., supra note 14, at 12.
29. Compare 1993 SEC ANN. REP. 38, with 2002 SEC ANN. REP. 53.
30. Id.
31. 1993 SEC ANN. REP. 24.
32. 2001 SEC ANN. REP. 34.
33. 2001 SEC ANN. REP. 169.
[Vol. 28:2:233
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Throughout this period, fees collected by the SEC far exceeded its an-
nual appropriations. In 1993, for example, total fee collections of $517 mil-
lion represented "204 percent of the Agency's appropriated spending author-
ity of $253 million. 34  By 2001, the SEC deposited $2.06 billion in the
United States Treasury or 539% of the Agency's $382.4 million budget."
Neither the Clinton Administration nor Congress gave the SEC ade-
quate budgetary or staff support during Levitt's Chairmanship.
As a general matter, the Clinton White House was little concerned with
the SEC. With the exception of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,36
which primarily addressed banks, the Clinton White House exhibited little
interest in securities legislation. To be sure, the Clinton White House rarely
questioned an SEC decision during Levitt's chairmanship. But what the
Clinton Administration appeared most to want was a sufficiently well run
SEC so that it would not require White House attention.
Before Levitt was confirmed, President Clinton's FY 1994 budget
called for a reduction of forty-two positions in the Commission budget.37
With a few exceptions, Clinton's appointments to the SEC, other than Levitt,
were undistinguished, often appointed for transparently political reasons,
rather than their qualifications to be a commissioner. For sustained periods
during the Clinton administration, only two or three commissioners in fact
were in office.38 Indeed, in 1995, the Commission took the unprecedented
step of adopting a quorum rule to provide that if the number of commission-
ers in office was as few as two or one, that number would be sufficient for a
quorum.3 9 The senior staff appointed by Levitt was consistently stronger
with outstanding division directors or general counsel such as William
McLucas, Linda Quinn, Richard Walker, and Harvey Goldschmid.
34. 1993 SEC ANN. REP. 80.
35. 2001 SEC ANN. REP. 119.
36. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
37. John M. Doyle, Clinton Budget Plan Calls for SEC to Cut 42 Posts; Move May Im-
peril Probes, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 1993, available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-
search/we/Archives?pproduct=BG&ptheme=bg&paction=search&pmaxdocs=200&p-tex
t_searcho='Clinton%2OBudget%2oPlan%2oCalls%2OFor20SEC'&s-dispstring=Cinton%2
OBudget%20Plan%2OCalls%2OFor 0/o2OSEC%20AND%20date(4/l/1993%20to%204/30/1993
)&p field date-0=YMDdate&p_paramsdate-0=date:B,E&ptextdate-0=4/1/1993%20to%
204/30/1993&p_perpage= 10&psort=YMDdate:D&xcal useweights=n.
38. See U.S. SEC, HISTORICAL SUMMARY, at http://www.sec.gov/about/concise.shtml
#history (last visited Oct. 24, 2003).
39. Establishment of Commission Quorum Requirement, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
35548, (Mar. 30, 1995) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200 (1995)). In 1996, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court held that the quorum rule was validly adopted. Falcon Trading Group,
Ltd. v. SEC, 102 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing La Peyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117, 122
(5th Cir. 1966)).
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Each year Levitt's Congressional testimony on the budget was an exer-
cise in frustration, or, at best, damage control. On July 29, 1993, two days
after being sworn in, Levitt testified to the Senate Securities Subcommittee:
[t]he Commission has an urgent need for additional resources to conduct
examinations and perform an oversight function for investment advisers
and investment companies. Between 1981 and 1993, the number of regis-
tered advisers increased from 5,100 to more than 18,000, and assets man-
aged by investment advisers rose from $450 billion to over $9 trillion.
Staff resources have lagged so far behind this phenomenal growth that the
Commission is currently able to inspect some advisers only once every
thirty years.
A resource need also exists for inspections of investment companies. We
are able currently to perform limited annual inspections of money market
funds, funds in the 100 largest fund complexes, and some small fund
complexes. A growing number of new fund complexes, including many
that recently have been organized by banks, have not been inspected, ex-
cept for their money market funds.
4 0
Levitt sought, and was that year denied, resources "to add almost 200
examiners to its staff, which would significantly enhance our inspection pro-
gram by reducing the lengthy inspection cycle. In addition, our authorization
request, if approved, would provide the Commission with much-needed re-
sources to shorten the inspection cycle for investment companies. '
In November 1993, Levitt testified in favor of self-funding as a means
to resolve the problem of insufficient staff: "To ensure that the Commission
has adequate resources it must be self-funded. Under a self-funding ar-
rangement known as full-cost recovery, the Commission would be author-
ized to use filing and transaction fee collections to fund all agency operations
instead of using annual appropriated funds., 42 Levitt took pains to "empha-
size that self-funding would not remove the Commission from Congressional
oversight."'43 Whether because of Congressional concern on this point or a
more generalized unwillingness to support a better funded SEC, full Com-
mission self-funding was not approved at any time during Levitt's Chair-
40. Concerning the Commission's Authorization for Fiscal Years 1994-1995: Hearing
Before the Senate Subcomm. on See., Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs,
103rd Cong. 2-3 (1993) (opening statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
41. Id. at3.
42. Oversight Hearing on the Mutual Fund Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Secs. of the Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 62 (1993)
(statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
43. Id.
[Vol. 28:2:233
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manship.44 In retrospect, Levitt would term the self-funding initiative "na-
ive." "Congress was unwilling to give up the pursestrings," he would ex-
plain in an interview with the author.
After the 1994 Congressional elections, budget appropriations for the
Commission became more difficult. Soon after the new Congress was con-
vened, an effort was led by the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee to
halt the effectiveness of all new federal rules, including SEC rules, adopted
between November 9, 1994 and June 30, 1995.4 5 The rule moratorium sub-
sequently was not pursued because of concerns it would wreak havoc with
44. 1994 SEC ANN. REP. 76. The 1994 SEC Annual Report described the strange fate of
the Commission's 1994-1995 authorizations:
In 1993, the House passed an SEC authorization bill for 1994-95, which con-
tained a provision for SEC self-funding. Senate budgetary rules, and the opposition
of some Senators to the concept of SEC self-funding, prevented the Senate from tak-
ing comparable action. The SEC's fiscal 1995 appropriation, which relied on a form
of self-funding to offset the SEC's appropriation, was supported by the SEC's ap-
propriations subcommittees but ultimately fell to disagreements over SEC fees and
self-funding generally. As a result of these disagreements, Congress passed a stop-
gap SEC appropriation bill in August 1994 providing only $125 million (Pub. L.
No. 103-317), with the intention of revisiting the issue of SEC funding and passing
a supplemental appropriations bill within five months. OMB determined, however,
that applicable federal law required the SEC to apportion that partial appropriation
as if it were the full appropriation for the fiscal year. Consequently, the SEC faced a
budget shortfall of approximately $172 million and the possibility of severe curtail-
ment of operations.
Due to jurisdictional disputes in the House, the availability of an additional SEC
appropriation was conditioned on the enactment of separate revenue legislation,
raising SEC registration fees, that would offset the SEC's additional appropriation.
Thus, to fund the SEC fully, it was necessary for Congress to pass two separate
pieces of legislation in the two month period before the end of the session-an addi-
tional appropriation and a separate revenue bill.
The bill providing for an additional SEC appropriation of $192 million was
signed into law on September 30, 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-335). The revenue legisla-
tion, H.R. 5060, which set the filing fees under Securities Act Section 6(b) at the
rate of 1/29th of one percent, passed the House on September 27, 1994, but was
held up in the Senate as various Senators sought to add unrelated provisions to the
last major revenue bill of the 103rd Congress. H.R. 5060 finally passed the Senate
on October 8, and was signed into law on October 10, 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-352),
thus bringing SEC funding to $297 million. In the early days of fiscal 1995 before
the revenue bill's passage, the SEC had to curtail inspections, enforcement activity,
and other "non-essential" services.
Id. See also Senate Hearings: Hearing on H.R. 4603 Before the Subcomm. of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations of the Comm. on Ap-
propriations, 103d Cong. 887 (1995) (opening statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
45. Lynn Stevens Hume, GOP Senators May Be Giving up on Regulatory Moratorium
Bill, THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 20, 1995, at 2.
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regulatory agencies.46 But approximately the same time House Commerce
Committee Chair Thomas Bliley and others negotiated an agreement with the
SEC to reduce the fees paid to the United States Treasury for new securities
offerings.4 7 By the summer of 1995, new legislation had been introduced to
redefine the Commission's mission, freeze the SEC budget for five years,
and reduce the number of SEC Commissioners from five to three.48 In July
1995, Bliley deputized Congressman Frisa to conduct a "top to bottom re-
view" of SEC operations with the aim of "cutting all regulatory deadwood."' 9
Levitt attempted to defuse the deregulatory enthusiasm. Within a few
months he appointed Phillip K. Howard, author of a book critical of federal
regulation entitled The Death of Common Sense to chair a commission task
force on disclosure simplification.50 In 1996, the Task Force recommended
the elimination of a total of eighty-one Commission rules and twenty-two
forms, as well as the modification of "dozens of others."'"
Levitt tentatively embraced several Task Force proposals, starting on
March 5, 1996; that he found especially promising: 1) An investor-friendly
prospectus, whose cover page and first few pages would be written in plain
English, as opposed to the usual boilerplate-laden prose;52 2) A "profile"
tender offer summary that brings together the most important information,
saving potential investors from having to hunt through the entire document;53
3) The federal government would get even further out of the way of small
offerings to local areas, leaving primary oversight to state and local authori-
ties; 4) Small businesses would be able to raise twice as much money as they
can today under Regulation A-$5 million every six months rather than
every year.5"
46. Id.
47. Jeffrey Taylor, Republicans Reach Accord with SEC to Reduce Fees, WALL ST. J.,
June 30, 1995, at B12. The fee reduction legislation, later further amended, is codified in
section 6(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 and section 31 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See generally Securities Act of 1933 § 6(b), at
http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/33Act/sec6.html; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 31, 15
U.S.C. 78c (2000).
48. Michael Schroeder, Guess Who's Gunning for the SEC, Bus. WK., Aug. 14, 1995, at
40.
49. Id.
50. Mark H. Anderson, SEC Task Force is Seeking Ways to Ease Regulations on Busi-
ness, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1995, at A3, available at 1995 WL-WSJ 9898303.
51. Report on Disclosure Simplification, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,738 (Mar. 5, 1996).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
[Vol. 28:2:233
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In 1996 and 1997, the Commission adopted several Task Force recom-
mendations. 5 Cumulatively the changes that the Commission made elimi-
nated or modified a number of marginal aspects of the earlier adopted inte-
grated disclosure system. The basic system remained largely intact. But the
political implication of this Task Force was clear. The Commission would
have to backpedal by administrative action to reduce the likelihood of more
deregulatory legislation. Levitt's business background made the backpedal-
ing appear less contrived to those favoring deregulation.
Nearly simultaneously, Levitt appointed Commissioner Steven
Wallman to Chair a Commission Advisory Committee on Capital Formation
and Regulatory Processes. 6 Levitt and Wallman had a complex relationship
and the motivation for the appointment of this Committee also involved
Levitt's desire to find a significant project for Wallman.
The Wallman Committee Report later also sounded deregulatory
themes, most significantly proposing that the Commission go further than the
earlier adopted integrated disclosure system to adopt a system of company
registration for companies issuing securities.5 ' This proposal was primarily
intended to remove unnecessary costs and restrictions on issuer access to
capital while also enhancing investor protection through improvements in the
disclosure process. 8
These near simultaneous initiatives may have strengthened Levitt's
hand in what was a particularly difficult budget cycle. In September 1995,
the Senate Appropriations Committee approved a bill cutting the Commis-
sion's budget by 20% to $237 million for FY 1996, after the full House had
adopted a bill to freeze the Commission budget at $297 million. 9 The Sen-
ate also voted to abolish altogether the Commission's Office of Investor
Education and Assistance.6°
55. Phase One Recommendations of Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, Securities
Act Release No. 7300, 62 SEC Docket 75 (May 31, 1996); Phase Two Recommendations of
Task Force on Disclosure Simplification, Securities Act Release No. 7431, 62 SEC Docket 2
(July 18, 1997). See generally 2 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 624-
27 (3d ed. rev. 1999).
56. Report of the Advisory Comm. on the Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes,
[1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,834 (July 24, 1996).
57. Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 7314, 62 SEC Docket 1046, 1048 (July 25, 1996).
58. See generally 1 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 391-98 (3d
ed. rev. 1998).
59. Lynn S. Hume, Democrats Blast Senate Panel's Proposed SEC Funding Cuts, BOND
BUYER, Sept. 27, 1995, at 3.
60. Cutting the Securities Cops, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1995, at C6.
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Title IV of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act
("NSMIA") of 1996 soon reduced SEC fee collections over a ten-year period
to better align fee collections with the funding needs of the Commission.6'
NSMIA, notably, however, did not simultaneously adopt the type of self-
funding that Levitt earlier and later characterized as vital to the effective
functioning of the Commission.62
The Commission ultimately did receive a FY 1996 budget of $301 mil-
lion (including $4 million in prior year carryover funds) with no increase in
staff positions.63 For FY 1997, Levitt began his budget testimony by almost
wistfully noting that when the Commission had last submitted an authoriza-
tion request in June 1994 covering FY 1995-1997, the Agency had sought
$382.7 million for FY 19 9 7.6 In February 1996, Levitt sought an authoriza-
tion of $317 million for FY 1997,65 which, in May 1996, Levitt testified that
the President requested be reduced to $308.2 million as part of a "'no
growth' budget. '66  Congress ultimately approved $305.4 million for FY
1997, which, when combined with prior year carryover funds of $5.7 million
equaled $311.1 million, and again meant no increase in staff.
67
To achieve this funding level, Levitt characterized the SEC "as rein-
vent[ing] itself... continually [searching] out new ways of regulating more
effectively but less intrusively, and at a [lower] cost to industry and inves-
tors. ' ' 68 Among other steps, the Commission raised the total asset threshold
for registrants to be subject to the Security Exchange Act from $5 million to
$10 million,69 reducing the number of companies subject to registration re-
quirement of that Act.
For FY 1998, President Clinton again directed the SEC to seek a "no-
growth" budget with respect to staffing levels and a $12 million larger ap-
61. Fees Collected Under the Securities Act of 1933: Hearing Before the Senate Sub-
comm. on Secs. of the Comm. on Senate Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. 3
(1999) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
62. Id.
63. The Securities and Exchange Commission Reauthorization Act of 1996: Hearing on
H.R. 2972 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the Comm. on Commerce, 104th
Cong. 10 n. 1 (1996) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter SEC Reauthori-
zation Act of 1996]; 1996 SEC ANN. REP. 213.
64. The SEC Reauthorization Act of 1996, supra note 63, at 10 n. 1.
65. Id. at 10.
66. Concerning Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 104th Cong. 207 (1996) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
67. 1997 SEC ANN. REP. 208.
68. SEC Reauthorization Act of 1996, supra note 63, at 6.
69. Relief from Reporting by Small Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 34-37157, 61
SEC Docket 2092 (May 1, 1996).
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propriation overall, most of which "would go to mandatory increases in pay
and related personnel benefits."7 For the fourth consecutive year the ulti-
mate Congressional appropriation froze staff positions.7'
By March 1998, when Levitt testified about the FY 1999 budget, the
presidential and congressional parsimony was beginning to have serious im-
plications for the Commission's ability to perform its core mission. Levitt
testified: "Between 1980 and 1994, the number of SEC authorized positions
increased 35%. To put that in perspective, for the same period assets under
management of Investment companies and Investment advisers increased
964% and 2082%, respectively. However, since 1995, authorized positions
have been flat."
7 1
Levitt noted with particular concern:
In fiscal 1997, turnover at the SEC increased dramatically, especially in
our three major program occupations (attorneys, accountants, and securi-
ties compliance examiners). For example, the SEC's overall turnover rate
in fiscal 1997 was 11.9% compared to 9.5% in fiscal 1996. The 1997
turnover rate for attorneys was 16% compared to 11.3% in 1996. The
1997 turnover rate for accountants.., was 12.1% compared to 9%, and
for examiners the rate was 10.8% compared to 10.3%. By comparison,
government-wide white collar turnover has been in the range of 7-8% a
year for the last couple of fiscal years.
73
The Clinton FY 1999 budget request sought an increase of $26.1 mil-
lion and thirty new staff positions above the SEC's 1998 appropriation.74
Congress ultimately approved a budget that added sixty-two positions and
$36 million to the FY 1999 appropriation.75
In retrospect, it is clear that the FY 1999 increase was too little, too late.
As early as 1998, newspapers were publishing articles with headlines such as
"SEC Turnover Rate Leaves Agency Scrambling in Fight against Fraud. 76
Or as a May 1998 article put it: "Ten Things the SEC Won't Tell You:
70. Appropriations for 1998, supra note 20, at 212.
71. 1998 SEC ANN. REP. 176.
72. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1999: Hearings Before a Senate Subcomm. on Appropriations, 105th
Cong. 296, 305 (1998) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
73. Id. at 311.
74. Id. at 293.
75. 1999 SEC ANN. REP. 197.
76. Michael Schroeder, SEC Turnover Rate Leaves Agency Scrambling in Fight against
Fraud, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1998, at B6.
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Number 1: 'We're overwhelmed.""' In 1998, in a move unprecedented at
the Commission, a growing number of the staff began to explore unioniza-
tion as a response to increased uncompensated extra hours, known as "'do-
nated' time"7 and low pay. 79 By a greater than two to one vote, unionization
was approved in 2000 for 1800 non-management SEC lawyers, accountants,
and support workers.8" This symbolized a low point in staff morale, largely a
response to the inadequate budgets approved by Congress and the inability of
the Clinton administration to effectively address a growing problem that per-
sisted year after year. Levitt would explain in an interview with the author
that he regarded unionization as a personal failure.
President Clinton and Congress supported a staff increase in FY 2000 of
134 positions (4.2%) and a budget increase of $26.3 million.8' In FY 2001,
Clinton and Congress supported a staff increase of fifty positions (1.5%) and
a budget increase of $44.9 million.82
Levitt repeatedly testified to the urgency of a considerably broader ef-
fort to staunch the growing inability of the Commission to effectively per-
form its core functions. In February 2000, for example, he asserted: "The
SEC is in the midst of a serious staffing crisis .... In the last two years, the
Commission has lost 25% of its attorneys, accountants, and examiners."83
After detailing threats to "our ability to oversee the nation's securities mar-
kets and to respond in a timely manner to the changing events ... in our
markets, '' 84 Levitt urged that SEC salary levels should be at the same levels
as those in the banking regulatory agencies such as the Federal Reserve, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (popularly known as "pay parity"), a salary increase of roughly
77. Robinson G. Clark, Ten Things the SEC Won't Tell You, SMART MONEY, May 1,
1999, at 147.
78. Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators: Unionization Vote Grows Out of SEC's Culture,
WASH. POST, June 4, 1999, at El.
79. Michael Schroeder, SEC Immersed in Testy Effort by Employees to Unionize, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 16, 1999, at Cl; Cindy Skrzycki, The Regulators; At SEC Skies are Suddenly
Sunnier, WASH. POST., Jan. 21, 2000, at El.
80. S.E.C. Workers Vote for Union, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2000, at C7.
81. 2000 SEC ANN. REP. 159.
82. 2001 SEC ANN. REP. 171.
83. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2001: Hearings on H.R. 4690 Before the Senate Subcomm. of
the Comm. on Appropriations, 106th Cong. 326 (2000) (testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman,
SEC) [hereinafter Appropriations for 2001]; see also The Competitive Market Supervision
Act: Hearing on S. 2107 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs,
106th Cong. 7, 39-40 (2000) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter Com-
petitive Market].
84. Competitive Market, supra note 83, at 7.
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24 to 39%.85 In Levitt's view, pay parity would improve staff morale and
lengthen the service time of the most talented entry level staff to "a minimum
of three to five years. 86 Levitt estimated that pay parity then would have
cost approximately $52 million. s7
Government Accounting Office ("GAO") reports in 2001 and 2002 pro-
vide detailed support for Levitt's complaints. A March 2002 GAO report,
SEC Operations: Increased Workload Creates Challenges, explained in
part:
SEC and industry officials said [the] SEC's ability to fulfill its mission has
become increasingly strained due in part to imbalances between [the]
SEC's workload (e.g., filings, complaints, inquiries, investigations, ex-
aminations, and inspections) and staff resources .... [S]ince 1996 [the]
SEC's staff resources have not grown commensurate with its workload.
Although industry officials complimented [the] SEC's regulation of the
industry given its staff size and budget, both SEC and industry officials
identified several challenges [the] SEC faces. First, resource constraints
have contributed to substantial delays in the turnaround time for many
SEC regulatory and oversight activities, such as approvals for rule filings
and exemptive applications. Second, [the] SEC's resource constraints
contributed to bottlenecks in the examination and inspection area as work-
load grew. Third, limited resources have forced [the] SEC to be selective
in its enforcement activities and have lengthened the time required to
complete certain enforcement investigations .... Finally, SEC and indus-
try officials said that [the] SEC has been increasingly challenged in ad-
dressing emerging issues, such as the ongoing internationalization of secu-
rities markets and technology-driven innovations like ATSs and ex-
change-traded funds ....
Over the last decade, staffing, within different areas of [the] SEC's regula-
tory oversight activities, has grown between 9 and 166 percent, while
workload measures in those areas have grown from 60 to 264 percent ....
For example, the number of corporate filings increased 60 percent, while
related review staff increased 29 percent. This figure also shows that the
number of complaints and inquiries received increased by 100 percent,
while the enforcement staff dedicated to investigate complaints and other
matters increased by 16 percent. In addition, the number of market and
firm supervision actions increased 137 percent, but the number of staff re-
sponsible for these activities increased 51 percent ....
85. Id.at4l.
86. Id.
87. Id.
2004]
15
Seligman: Self-Funding for the Securities and Exchange Commission
Published by NSUWorks, 2004
NOVA LA W REVIEW
.. . [A]bout one-third of [the] SEC's staff left the agency from 1998 to
2000. [The] SEC's turnover rate for attorneys, accountants, and examin-
ers averaged 15 percent in 2000, more than twice the rate for comparable
positions governmentwide. Although the rate had decreased to 9 percent
in 2001, turnover at [the] SEC was still almost twice as high as the rate
governmentwide. Further, as a result of this turnover and inability to hire
qualified staff quickly enough, about 250 positions remained unfilled in
September 2001. SEC officials said that they could do more if they had
more staff, but all cited [the] SEC's high turnover rate as a major chal-
lenge in managing its workload. Likewise, industry officials agreed that
many of the challenges [the] SEC faces today are exacerbated by its high
turnover rate, which results in more inexperienced staff and slower, often
less efficient, regulatory processes.
8 8
The GAO 2001 report concluded earlier, after surveying former and
current SEC staff, that they "'overwhelmingly cited low compensation as the
primary reason they left or might leave"' the Commission.89
What was most significant about the growing imbalance in staff relative
to its workload was that it tended to undermine core functions of the Com-
mission, such as review of corporate issuer annual reports by the Division of
Corporation Finance, more severely than it reduced the effectiveness of the
Commission to pursue new initiatives. In March 2000, for example, Levitt
complimented Senator Gregg and the Senate Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, State, and the Judiciary for their "vital support" in FY 2000 for an
additional $7 million appropriation to help fund the SEC's Internet fraud
program. 90 Combining this appropriation with the reprogramming of exist-
ing budget and staff had permitted the SEC to devote 92 positions to the
growing challenge of Internet fraud,9' as well as traditional areas such as
unregistered securities, financial fraud, and insider trading. Indeed, through-
out Levitt's Chairmanship, the number of enforcement actions generally
rose, averaging 489 enforcement actions initiated per year between 1994 and
200 1,92 compared with 359 per year averaged between 1990 and 1993,
roughly the period of the Breeden Chairmanship. 93 Particular attention was
88. GAO, SEC OPERATIONS: INCREASED WORKLOAD CREATES CHALLENGES, GAO-02-
302, at 11-13, 25 (Mar. 2002).
89. Low Pay Cited as Main Reason for Leaving SEC, GAO Says in Recent Report, 33
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1544 (2001).
90. Appropriations for 2001, supra note 83; David Wessel, Internet Mania is Like Lot-
tery, Fed Chief Says, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1999, at C1. Separately, Federal Reserve Chair
Alan Greenspan would bewail the mania for internet-related stocks. Id.
91. Appropriations for 2001, supra note 83.
92. See 1997 SEC ANN. REP. 1; 2001 SEC ANN. REP. 1.
93. See 1993 SEC ANN. REP. 1.
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devoted to "micro cap" and "penny stock" fraud94 and day trading abuses.95
Similarly, Levitt created an SEC Year 2000 Task Force which worked effec-
tively with the securities industry to obviate the risks of converting informa-
tion technology to year 2000 data.96
With approximately 3000 staff members throughout the Levitt Chair-
manship, the Commission had the capacity to effectively address many of the
burgeoning securities industry's regulatory challenges. 97 But it was spread
thin and increasingly so in the last years of the Levitt Chairmanship. In Oc-
tober 2002, a staff report of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
found that in FY 2001, the Division of Corporation Finance was able to
complete a full review of only 2,280 of 14,600 Form 10-K annual reports
filed by public companies, roughly 16%, far short of the Division's stated
goal to review every company's annual report at least once every three
years. 9 "Of more than 17,300 public companies, approximately 9,200, or
53%, have not had their Forms 10-K reviewed in the past three years."99
Enron, then the most notorious example of staff neglect, had last received a
partial review of its Form 10-K annual report in 1997 and had been last sub-
ject to a full review in 1991.00
94. Concerning Fraud in the "Micro Cap " Market: Hearing Before the Senate Perma-
nent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm. on Gov'tal Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony
of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
95. See generally Day Trading: An Overview: Hearing Before the Senate Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Gov'tal Affairs, 106th Cong. 7, 7-8 (1999)
(testimony of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
96. Report to the Congress on the Readiness of the United States Securities Industry and
Public Companies to Meet the Information Processing Challenges of the Year 2000 (June
1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/yr200O.htm. See generally U.S. Finan-
cial Institutions and Federal Regulatory Agencies Management of the Year 2000 Computer
Problem: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Finan. Servs. & Tech. of the Comm. on
Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 105th Cong. 59-61 (1997) (opening statement of Arthur
Levitt, Chairman, SEC). In all the Commission testified four times in 1997 and 1998 concern-
ing Y2K. See 1998 SEC ANN. REP. 89-90. In 1999 the Commission adopted several tempo-
rary Y2K rules designed to achieve compliance by the securities industry for mission critical
systems. 1999 SEC ANN. REP. 30-32.
97. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 8 (Comm. Print 2002),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sensecl007021tr.pdf (last visited Oct.
25, 2003).
98. Id. at 11.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 31-32.
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III. REVISITING THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCY
An independent regulatory agency is a constitutional novelty. It is nei-
ther fully part of the executive nor the legislative branch. It is a strikingly
vulnerable political actor. Former SEC Chair William Cary well captured
this vulnerability when he observed in 1967:
Government regulatory commissions are often referred to as "independ-
ent" agencies, but this cannot be taken at face value by anyone who has
ever had any experience in Washington. In fact, government regulatory
agencies are stepchildren whose custody is contested by both Congress
and the Executive, but without very much affection from either one ....
Without the cooperation of both Congress and the Executive, little con-
structive can be achieved. To reemphasize the point, an agency is literally
helpless if either branch is uninterested or unwilling to lend support.1
0
'
It is not inevitable that regulatory agencies be independent, or figura-
tively, Cary's unloved stepchildren. More consistent with our tripartite sepa-
ration of powers, "unitary" theorists have urged that all regulatory agencies
be consolidated into the Executive Branch.102 There is much to be said in
favor of the unitary approach. If the President is directly responsible for the
performance of an agency, the President may have a greater sense of respon-
sibility for its budget, appointments, legislation, and rules than the President
would for an independent agency.
Majoritarian theory clearly also favors Presidential control. Not only is
this idea consistent with the democratic norm of presidential elections, but it
is also the case that a single Presidential decisionmaker can prioritize budg-
etary and legislative preferences more effectively than unconsolidated inde-
pendent agencies can.
Given these considerations, an independent regulatory agency is, in fact,
the exception, not the rule. Three basic considerations typically have been
urged to justify their hybrid status in the limited circumstances in which
agency independence has been accorded.
First, an independent regulatory agency is depoliticized, at least to some
degree, to permit resolution of specific problems on the basis of standards
other than election results. The Federal Reserve Board ("Fed") is perhaps
101. WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 4 (1967).
102. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Symposium: The Independence of Independent Agen-
cies, 1988 DUKE L.J. 215, 220; NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR
AMERICA REVITALIZING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY, x (2003), avail-
able at http://www.brook.edu/gs/cps/volcker/reportfinal.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2003) (stat-
ing that his first recommendation was: "The federal government should be reorganized into a
limited number of mission-related executive departments.").
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our most respected independent regulatory agency today. The "Fed" is often
typified as an agency that makes economic policy decisions irrespective of
the imminence of an election. A Fed, in contrast, that was part of the execu-
tive branch presumably would find it more difficult to ignore the short-term
benefits of attractive interest rates or money supply even if this was less wise
in the long run. Similarly, a Federal Elections Commission that was part of a
political administration would be less trusted to require fair election proc-
esses than an independent agency.
The depoliticization of independent regulatory agencies has been com-
mended particularly for agency adjudication and to a lesser degree for rule-
making. Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr., of George Washington University,
for example, has written:
Insulation from political pressure seems most desirable in the context of
adjudicatory decisionmaking by agencies. No one wants the President, or
anyone else, to control the outcome of adjudicatory disputes based on the
political beliefs or affiliations of the individual whose rights are at stake.
Once we leave the adjudicatory context, the case for agency independ-
ence weakens. It does not disappear entirely, however. In the rulemaking
context, for instance, insulating agency decisionmakers from potential
presidential pressure might enhance the objectivity of the scientific analy-
sis on which a rule is premised.
10 3
Second, the independence of an agency may strengthen its adherence to
legislative standards. Given the press of legislative business, only periodi-
cally will Congress consider significant new regulatory legislation. The ul-
timate loyalty of an independent agency in a democracy should be to the
standards in its enabling legislation. Quite frequently, this legislation will
long predate the current executive administration. Agency independence can
be viewed as a means to protect loyalty to earlier legislation.
Third, a depoliticized independent regulatory agency may also be more
effective at addressing problems requiring technical expertise." This was
the emphasis of Frankfurter and Landis.'0 5 Indeed, Frankfurter envisioned
that a basic challenge of the New Deal period was to create the equivalent of
a British Civil Service to better enhance the likelihood of attracting the most
talented administrators to the New Deal's new independent regulatory agen-
cies."'
103. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 65 (4th ed. 2002).
104. See SELIGMAN, supra note 1, at 58-62.
105. See id.
106. Jd. at 60-61.
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The experience of the SEC is not entirely consistent with these theoreti-
cal considerations. Throughout much of the Commission's history, the value
of its staff s expertise has been limited by the mediocrity of presidential
Commission appointments and frequently inadequate budgets. The perform-
ance of the SEC has also been influenced by other more subtle political fac-
tors. Many of the SEC's most criticized decisions, such as those concerning
commission rates and the structure of the securities markets, can, in part, be
traced to the Agency's failure to apply the theory of economic competition
implicit in the federal antitrust laws to the securities industry, or to articulate
a persuasive alternative economic theory. Other decisions of the SEC, nota-
bly those concerning accounting standard setting and corporate governance,
seem to have been influenced by the breadth of the SEC's mandate. Like all
other political actors, the SEC has to select programs to emphasize. In part,
because of the vagueness of the relevant enabling statutes, accounting stan-
dard setting and corporate governance had been consistently relegated to the
bottom of the SEC's list of priorities.
Few have seriously suggested that the SEC has been a "captive" of the
industries it regulates. Quite simply, such a suggestion cannot be sustained
by a reasonable reading of the Commission's history. The "capture" theory
and its many variants are of relatively little use in explaining how any par-
ticular SEC decision was actually made. Such theories typically begin with
the unarticulated premise that all firms and trade associations in an industry
have identical aims. In fact, much of the power of an agency, such as the
SEC, is derived from the divisions within the industries it regulates. Accu-
rately perceived, the SEC did not directly "reorganize" the New York Stock
Exchange in 1937-1938. The Commission enabled a reform faction within
the Exchange to do so. The capture and kindred theories tend to underesti-
mate the political force of well prepared agency studies, the idealism of
agency staffs, the differences for an agency among proceeding by litigation,
a rule, or legislation, and the support that can be provided to an agency by
Congress or the press.
The solution of certain largely technical problems is likely to continue
to be administered by independent government agencies, because Congress,
the Judiciary, and the states lack sufficient time, expertise, or jurisdiction to
perform these functions equally well. But history does highlight the fre-
quently inadequate role that the White House and Congress have played in
overseeing the administrative agencies. Too often appointments of SEC
Commissioners have been made by the President as a form of political re-
ward, with the competence of the appointees to perform the job not receiving
sufficient consideration, and have been whisked through Senate confirmation
hearings. For sustained periods, Congress has ignored serious problems in
the securities or accounting profession that the SEC handled poorly. Neither
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the President nor Congress for much of the recent past were effective in ap-
proving an SEC budget responsive to the problems it regulates.
To put it simply, the question of whether it is wise to have independent
regulatory agencies invites consideration of a better question. If it is wise to
retain independent regulatory agencies, how can these agencies be designed
to operate more effectively?
IV. SELF-FUNDING
There are three fundamental techniques by which Congress and the
President, in fact, exert control over independent regulatory agencies: legis-
lation, budget, and appointments.
In a constitutional democracy, Congress should have ultimate legisla-
tive power. The independent regulatory agencies and Congress have
achieved an effective harmonization of congressional constitutional control
and agency expertise through agency rulemaking. Much of the detail of
agency administration is achieved through elaboration of enabling legisla-
tion. To offer two prosaic illustrations, in the 2002 edition of Federal Securi-
ties Laws: 1) Selected Statutes, Rules and Forms that I coedit, the Securities
Act of 1933 occupies forty-two pages, related rules and forms continue for
the next 452 pages;0 7 and 2) The Securities Exchange Act, the most signifi-
cant federal securities law, is 188 pages long, related rules and forms stretch
for 639 pages.
The balance between the independent regulatory agencies, on the one
hand, and Congress and the Executive Branch, on the other, has operated less
effectively with respect to budget and appointments.
The SEC, like most independent regulatory agencies, submits its budget
to the White House Office of Management and Budget, which consolidates
several agency budgets into a single request. Congress ultimately must both
"authorize" and "appropriate" agency expenditures.0 8
The current model has fairly been criticized for underfunding the SEC,
particularly during periods of surges in market activity.'0 9 It is an erratic
model. After periods of crisis, such as that which eventuated in the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act,"0 Congress and the President have been willing to make
107. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR., FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW:
SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND FORMS (2002).
108. See generally 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.22
(Supp. 1997).
109. See generally I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 58, at 301-04.
110. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101 et seq., 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(116 Stat. 750) 750.
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dramatic adjustments to the SEC's budget. In July 2002, for example, Con-
gress "authorized" but did not then appropriate a 66% increase in the Com-
mission's budget.'"
To Chairman Levitt, the answer to boom-bust budgeting was agency
self-funding, such as that which has long operated at the most effective inde-
pendent regulatory agency, the Federal Reserve Board."2
Section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes a form of self-
funding for the newly established Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board ("PCAOB"), as well as, the earlier established Financial Accounting
Standards Board ("FASB")." 3 Both, it bears stressing, are not independent
regulatory agencies, but are private self-regulatory organizations. The
PCAOB is expressly subject to SEC oversight for rulemaking and PCAOB
Board members are appointed by the Commission.14
Under section 109(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the PCAOB prepares
an annual budget which is approved by the Commission. The income to pay
for the PCAOB and the FASB is largely derived from annual accounting
fees" 5 which are to be equitably allocated issuers. Issuers which are sepa-
rately defined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to mean the firms that register with
the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act." 6
The SEC already has in place an effective fee collection mechanism
which in 2000 and 2001 collected over $2 billion each year." 7 In 2002, the
Agency collected more than $1 billion." 8 Each of these year's collections
111. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and Securities Law After
Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 510 (2002).
112. A Federal Reserve website usefully explains:
How is the Federal Reserve funded?
The income of the Federal Reserve System is derived primarily from the interest on U.S. gov-
emnment securities that it has acquired through open market operations. Other sources of in-
come are the interest on foreign currency investments held by the System; fees received for
services provided to depository institutions, such as check clearing, funds transfers, and auto-
mated clearinghouse operations; and interest on loans to depository institutions (the rate on
which is the so-called discount rate).
After it pays its expenses, the Federal Reserve turns the rest of its earnings over to the U.S.
Treasury. About 95 percent of the Reserve Banks' net earnings have been paid into the Treas-
ury since the Federal Reserve System began operations in 1914. (Income and expenses of the
Federal Reserve Banks are included in the annual report of the Board of Governors.)
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, at http://www.federal re-
serve.gov/faq.htm#frsq4 (last visited Jan. 22, 2004). See generally 12 U.S.C. § 243 (2000).
113. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 109, 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116
Stat. 745) 769.
114. § 101(e).
115. § 109(c)-(g).
116. § 2(a)(7).
117. 2001 SEC Ann. Rep. tbl. 16.
118. 2002 SEC Ann. Rep. tbl. 16.
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exceeds even the most ambitious SEC budget proposals for 2003 and 2004.
If they did not, fee levels could have been adjusted. A movement to self-
funding does not appear to raise questions of feasibility.
There are also persuasive arguments that a new approach is preferable.
SEC budgeting in the post World War II period has, in at least two very sig-
nificant periods, been overwhelmed by market surges. During the 1950s, the
Commission declined from its New Deal high of 1,678 employees in 1941 to
667 employees in 1955."' In the 1990s, the decline of staff effectiveness
occurred coincident with booming stock market prices. In both periods this
was followed by a serious increase in fraud,' 20 and subsequently by large
staff increases.' 2'
SEC self-funding would likely reduce the extremes that have been evi-
dent in the applicable OMB-Congressional process and to some extent depo-
liticize budgeting.
A difficult question is not feasibility nor need, but accountability. Who
would watch the guardians? At the Federal Reserve Board, a straightforward
accountability system is in place. Under 12 U.S.C. § 243 the Federal Re-
serve Board is empowered to
levy semiannually upon the Federal Reserve banks, in proportion to their
capital stock and surplus, an assessment sufficient to pay its estimated ex-
penses and the salaries of its members and employees for the half year
succeeding the levying of such assessment, together with any deficit car-
ried forward from the preceding half year, and such assessments may in-
clude amounts sufficient to provide for the acquisition by the Board in its
own name of such site or building in the District of Columbia as in its
judgment alone shall be necessary for the purpose of providing suitable
and adequate quarters for the performance of its functions.1
22
Congress has two accountability mechanisms. First, under 12 U.S.C. §
248(a) there is an annual independent audit of the financial statement of the
Board (as well as each Federal Reserve Bank). 123 Second, Congress retains
its general oversight and legislative powers with respect to the Board.
24
The Federal Reserve Board's self-funding has been the key to its his-
toric high level of performance, its professionalism, and its ability to with-
stand political pressures. The alternative approach would require the Fed to
119. See 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 58, at 301.
120. SELIGMAN, supra note 1, chs. 9-10.
121. See I Loss& SELIGMAN, supra note 58, at 298. By 1962, the staff had approximately
doubled to 1336 employees. Id. at 301.
122. 12 U.S.C. § 243 (2000).
123. See § 247(a).
124. See § 248.
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seek annual budget approval from Congress. At that point, its ability to
maintain independence would be reduced.
A similar approach to SEC budgeting should be enacted. The Commis-
sion currently operates under provisions such as section 6(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933, designed to recover the costs of the government of the securities
registration process 25 and section 31 of The Securities Exchange Act of
1934, designed to recover the costs of the supervision and regulation of secu-
rities markets and securities professionals and specified related costs. 26 Both
section 6(b) and section 31 have targeted offsetting collection amounts and
statutorily specified fee levels.
2 7
The volatility in SEC fee collections in 2000, 2001, and 2002 strongly
commends an alternative approach. As with the Fed, the SEC should be em-
powered to specify assessment levels on an annual or semiannual basis. Fees
should solely be intended to achieve cost recovery, including, however, a
contingent reserve to even out assessment volatility. The SEC should be
required to file an annual audited financial statement with Congress, which
could form the basis of oversight hearings. Congress, in any event, would
retain its general oversight powers and ability to amend, add to, or rescind
federal securities legislation.
A significant practical advantage of the Fed approach to SEC budgeting
would be to avoid periodic atrophy of SEC staff during boom economies.
Just as it has historically been regarded as essential to insulate the Federal
Reserve Board from political pressures to protect its independent judgment
on questions of monetary policy, it is also wise to insulate the SEC from staff
size declines during market surges. The need for budgetary independence is
similar, but not identical. History has taught us that a fundamental threat to
support for an independent SEC is a successful stock market. Both Congress
and the President are most likely to be supportive during periods when inves-
tor protection and fraud enforcement are emphasized. An independent budg-
etary process would be more effective in adjusting the size of the SEC staff
to the Agency's regulatory needs during the good times, which ironically are
when the SEC is more vulnerable to a lack of budgetary support.
In contrast, it is unlikely that an effective legislative change can be
made to the appointments process. With occasional exceptions, the SEC in
the post World War II period has usually had strong Chairs and weaker other
125. Securities Act of 1933 § 6(b), at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/33Act/Sec6.html; see
15 U.S.C. § 78dee (2000).
126. Securities Act of 1934 § 31, at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34Act/Sec3 I.html; 15
U.S.C. § 78ee.
127. Securities Act of 1933 § 6(b), at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/33Act/Sec6.html; Secu-
rities Act of 1934 § 31, at http://www.law.uc.edu/CCL/34Act/Sec3 l.html.
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Commissioners. The statutory requirements for appointment to the SEC is in
section 78d(a), which provides in relevant part:
There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission ... to
be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Not more than three of
such commissioners shall be members of the same political party, and in
making appointments members of different political parties shall be ap-
pointed alternately as nearly as may be practicable. No commissioner
shall engage in any other business, vocation, or employment than that of
serving as commissioner, nor shall any commissioner participate, directly
or indirectly, in any stock-market operations or transactions of a character
subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to this chapter. Each
Commissioner shall hold office for a term of five years and until his suc-
cessor is appointed and has qualified...128
Congress wisely emphasized political balance in the SEC model. But
vesting the power to appoint representatives from the rival political party in
the President "has made [this] provision only a pious hope" as the late Pro-
fessor Loss and I elsewhere have written.
29
During the Clinton and second Bush presidencies, a wiser appointment
model has evolved by extrastatutory agreement. Senate leaders of the lead-
ing other political party have proposed the minority of the commissioners
representing the rival political party. This extrastatutory approach wisely
should be continued. It was striking that during the SEC Chairmanship of
Harvey Pitt in 2002, Harvey Goldschmid, a second SEC Commissioner of
quality equal to that of SEC Chairs, was appointed after proposal by the
leaders of the leading other political party. This extrastatutory approach to
SEC appointments can result in at least two highly qualified commissioners.
Under article II section 2 clause 2 of the United States Constitution, how-
ever, only the President can formally exercise the appointment power to an
administrative agency. 3° Neither Congress nor the SEC Chair can be em-
powered to make any appointment of a commissioner to the SEC.
Are there alternatives Congress should consider? In the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act, Congress explicitly recognized that leadership quality is an issue
when it provided in § 101(e):
(1) COMPOSITION. - The Board [Public Company Accounting Oversight]
shall have 5 members, appointed from among prominent individuals of in-
128. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a).
129. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 58, at 292; see generally I Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 58, at 288-300.
130. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,272 (1976).
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tegrity and reputation who have demonstrated a commitment to the inter-
ests of investors and the public, and an understanding of the responsibili-
ties for and nature of the financial disclosures required of issuers under the
securities laws and the obligations of accountants with respect to the
preparation and issuance of audit reports with respect to such disclsoures.
(2) LIMITATION. - Two members, and only 2 members, of the Board shall
be or have been certified public accountants pursuant to the laws of 1 or
more States, provided that, if I of those 2 members is the chairperson, he
or she may not have been a practicing certified public accountant for at
least 5 years prior to his or her appointment to the Board.1
3
'
Given the breadth of the SEC's jurisdiction and the risk of agency cap-
ture, it would be unwise to require any specific industry association for
Commission appointment. A less far reaching approach might focus on staff
experience.
There have now been over eighty commissioners appointed during the
agency's nearly seventy years. SEC commissioners have come from the
industry, the legal profession, Congress (both legislators and staff), White
House staff, academia, and the agency itself. The most consistent appoint-
ments in terms of competence have been former SEC employees. In the
New Deal period, for example, SEC Chair William 0. Douglas began work
at the SEC in a senior staff position. In the post World War I1 period, such
outstanding commissioners or Chairs as Manuel Cohen, Ray Garrett, Jr., and
Irv Pollack earlier served the SEC in senior staff positions.
The Securities Exchange Act could be amended to require this type of
experience. For example, the amended statute might provide that the Presi-
dent would appoint five commissioners with the advice and consent of the
Senate, including the Chair, at least one of whom was currently serving or
had earlier served as General Counsel, Associate General Counsel, Director
or Associate Director of an SEC Division. All commissioners should con-
tinue otherwise to be subject to the requirements of section 4(a) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act.
I do not believe the case for such an approach can easily be made. Sen-
ior staff has also varied in talent and quality. One unfortunate consequence
of such an amendment might be to politicize senior positions which usually
have been made on the merits. Even with this potential concern, the compe-
tence of senior SEC staff has so significantly exceeded most SEC commis-
sioners that this approach might wisely be considered.
131. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(e), 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116
Stat. 745) 751.
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V. CONCLUSION
The last decade has taught much about the limitations, as well as, the
strengths of the SEC. The proposal in this essay to address the SEC's budget
is intended to strengthen an agency that has generally succeeded in improv-
ing investor protection. Self-funding would reduce the risk of misalignment
between the SEC's staff size and statutory functions. Having recently lived
through a period of trillion dollar losses to investors, in part, because of an
inadequately staffed Commission, I believe the costs of a binge-purge budg-
eting process wisely should be alleviated.
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